Are Justice and Harmony Mutually Exclusive? A Response to Professor Nader by King, Carol J.
Are Justice and Harmony Mutually Exclusive?
A Response to Professor Nader
CAROL J. KING*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law,1 Professor Laura
Nader faults mediation for advancing a harmony ideology defined as the
"use of a rhetoric of peace through consensus" which she sees as becoming
pervasive in American life. 2
Professor Nader states, first, that harmony ideology is "accompanied
by an intolerance for conflict" and implies that the suppression of discord is
its goal.3 When harmony is exalted, society views compromise as more
noble than the vindication of rights, 4 presumably even when the participants
to the conflict are forced to compromise against their wills. In short, she
equates harmony with repression. Second, she views the traditional
adversarial litigation system, in which individual rights are guaranteed by
the Constitution and enforced by activist lawyers, as protective of society.5
She sees modem society currently at risk of being controlled by covert,
hidden legal processes. 6 In particular, she perceives the expanding use of
mediation, usually a confidential process, as posing a grave danger to
justice. She is especially concerned that mediation further disadvantages
women, minorities, and the poor. 7 In an attempt to support the theory that
mediation is inherently repressive, Professor Nader notes that powerful
members of the legal profession generated the early discussions of the
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I Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law. Hierarchy and Pacification
in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1 (1993).
2 Id. at 1-2.
3 1d. at 3.
4I1&
5 Id. at 1.
6 Nader, supra note 1, at 2.
7 Id. at3.
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possible benefits of alternatives to litigation.8 Presumably, the fact that
influential members of the establishment promoted mediation indicates its
adoption will suit their purposes of preserving the status quo by inhibiting
protection of private rights. She further notes that lawyers have accepted the
validity of mediation rhetoric without question, abandoning their traditional
role as guardians of justice in the adversary system. She tries to draw an
analogy between the acceptance of mediation by the legal profession and the
hierarchiacal suppression of criticism by associates of working conditions in
large law firms.9 All Professor Nader's assertions are subject to differing
interpretations.
Professor Nader confuses the suppression of conflict through indirect
attitudinal controls with the attempted resolution of conflict through
mediation. Certainly, our society attempts to encourage conformity and
suppress criticism by social controls. However, once conflict is expressed
and a remedy demanded, these attempts have already failed. The conflict
can no longer be contained; it must be addressed. To resolve the dispute,
one must determine what process should be used. The specific question is
whether mediation is an unfair dispute resolution process, however fairness
is defined.
To a great extent, the argument about which dispute resolution process
is inherently superior is rooted in the clash of competing values. Our society
exists in a state of constant tension between the assertion of individual rights
and the need for compromise and cooperation in order to maintain group
functioning. The choice of an appropriate dispute resolution process is
situational, not a question of right or wrong. It will depend upon the nature
of the conflict and the people involved. Although mediation encourages
compromise and cooperative problem solving, it is not usually a tool for
repression. The conclusion that mediation is more likely to suppress than
resolve conflict rests on a misunderstanding of the process and purpose of
mediation.
This Article begins by quesitoning Professor Nader's theory that
mediation is a vehicle used by powerful members of society to repress
criticism. The next sections discuss the mediation process, public policy
issues concerning mediation, and power imbalances. Finally, the issue of
lawyer submission to the rhetoric of alternative dispute resolution is
addressed.
A. The History of Mediation and the Conspiracy Theory
In three observations, Professor Nader finds support for her contention
8 Nader, supra note 1, at 6.
9 Id. at 1.
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that a small group of powerful attorneys and policy makers are forcing the
populace to accept mediation, rather than litigation, of disputes in order to
repress the assertion of rights incompatible with the status quo - a hidden
agenda of repressive thought control.
First, to support her thesis that mediation is being forced upon the
populace from the top down, Professor Nader notes that Chief Justice
Warren Burger and other jurists began to criticize the litigious nature of
American society at the 1976 Pound Conference on the causes of
dissatisfaction with the American justice system. The conference focused on
replacing adversarial procedures with alternative dispute resolution.' 0
Mediation was one of the ideas proposed to improve the legal system."
Soon, she argues, trial attorneys, federal judges, and even lawyers who had
been activists for the poor were influenced by the ideas of the legal elite and
joined the anti-litigation crusade. 12
It is certianly true that some members of the legal profession began to
encourage the use of alternatives to adversarial litigation at the Pound
Conference. 13 However, the movement in favor of non-traditional forms of
dispute resolution came from other sources as well.
Mediation was also on the agenda of a group of people concerned about
the breakdown of communities. This group promoted the establishment of
local dispute resolution centers with the hope of facilitating a renewed sense
of neighborhood cohesion and decentralization of social control. 14 The
10 Nader, supra note 1, at 5. The term alternative dispute resolution includes, but is not
limted, to mediation. Other processes included under the general ruberic of ADR include
arbitration, early neutral evaluation, and mini-trials. These other processes differ from
mediation and pose different policy questions. This article focuses on mediation.
11 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERBNCE:
PERspECTIm ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 67, 74-76, 80 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R.
Wheeler eds., 1979).
12 Nader, supra note 1, at 2.
13 Hon. Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation,
in TiE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 11, at 23, 33-34; See also Sander, supra note 11, at
65. Chief Justice Burger suggested community panels could be used to resolve small claims,
and that greater use of arbitration should be considered. Professor Sander's presentation
focused on examining alternatives to traditional litigation. The Conference assumed the
existence of problems with the justice system, as reflected in language in the subtitle,
"Proceedings of the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice."
14 See, e.g., NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY,
PRACTICE § 4.2 (1989); CENTER FOR COMMUNITY JUSTICE 5, 6 (1982); Sally E. Merry,
Defining "Success" in the Neighborhood Justice Movement, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE:
ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA 172, 181 (Roman Tomasic & Malcolm M. Feeley eds.,
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people involved in the community mediation movement tended to come
from the ministry and the helping professions. The focus of this movement
was not merely on creating alternatives to court, but also on peacemaking
and reconciliation, often rooted in religious beliefs. 15 These proponents of
mediation did not share Chief Justice Burger's agenda for court reform, and
often wished to avoid tying mediation too closely to the courts. 16
It is impossible to prove or disprove Professor Nader's theory that
mediation is being pushed onto the populace by a conspiracy of powerful
members of the legal profession in order to suppress conflict. Although part
of the impetus toward mediation came from influential, powerful members
of the bar and the judiciary, 17 people from other walks of life, with different
agendas, independently began to see merit in alternatives to the adversarial
trial system. Momentum for alternative dispute resolution came from
several professional arenas at approximately the same time. Professor Nader
briefly notes other sources of the movement toward mediation, but
discounts their import.' s
The Pound Conference participants were drawn primarily from the
federal courts, high state courts, bar associations, and legal academia.' 9 The
use of alternative dispute resolution in domestic relations cases was touched
on, but not emphasized. 20 In the years following the conference, however,
the use of divorce mediation expanded significantly. 21 Supporters of family
mediation believed that adjudication of custody disputes was a destructive
way to resolve disputes over the care of minor children. Mediation was
viewed as more likely than trial to allow full discussion and accommodation
of the parents' underlying concerns. Mediated settlements were perceived as
more responsive than court orders .to the family's needs. 22 The growing
1982); Roman Tomasic, Mediation as an Alternative to Adjudication: Rhetoric and Reality in
the Neighborhood Justice Movement, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN
EMERGING IDEA 215, 230 (Roman Tomasic & Malcolm M. Fcclc5 c.:s., 1982).
15 See JENNIFER E. BEER, FRIENDS SUBURBAN PROJECT, PEACEMAKING IN YOUR
NEIGHBORHOOD 2, 3 (1986); RONALD S. KRAYBiLL, REPAIRING THE BREACH: MINISTERING IN
COMMUNITY CONFLICT 7, 8 (1981).
16 BEER, supra note 15, at 204-05, 225.
17 More detailed information and analysis of the backgrounds of legal professionals
promoting mediation may reveal many different, even conflicting purposes served by assisted
settlement negotiations.
18 Nader, supra note 1, at 7.
19 THE POUND CONFERENCE, PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE App. C. (A.
Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) [hereinafter THE POUND CONFERENCE].
20 Sander, supra note 11, at 76; Burger, supra note 13, at 33-34.
21 ROGERS & MCEwEN, supra note 14, § 4.3.
22 Jay Folberg, Mediation of Child Custody Disputes, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBS.
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acceptance of mediation had significant interdisciplinary support. 23
Although attorneys are far from absent in divorce mediation practice, the
majority of practicing family mediators are mental health professionals.24
Second, Professor Nader argues that the unsupported rhetoric of the
"litigation explosion" allow an inference that alternatives to litigation are
unnecessary, and thus suspect as inhibiting vindication of rights. She
indicates that talk of an overblown increase in litigiousness in America has
been used to push for alternatives to trial.25 Proponents of alternative
dispute resolution argue that the great increase in legal filings has
overburdened the courts, making alternative means of handling cases a
necessity. 26 Professor Nader cites studies to support her argument that the
so-called litigation explosion is a myth. 27 She argues that the absence of a
dramatic increase in civil court filings supports her conspiracy theory. 28
Although Professor Marc Galanter, whom Professor Nader cites,
questions the magnitude of the increase in court case filings, his work
indicates that caseloads, particularly in federal courts, have increased in
recent years. 29 He argues that the popular interpretation of this increase as
reflective of community breakdown is insufficiently grounded in evidence. 30
Galanter does not focus on the number of criminal case filings, but he
notes that the content of the state court caseload has shifted noticeably to
criminal cases. 31 Commentators have noted that the federalization of many
413, 418-21 (1985); JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUiDE TO RESOLVING CoNFLcrs WrrHouT LITIGATION 179 (1984); NEW YORK STATE LAW
REVISION COMMISSION, Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the 1985
Legislature Relating to the Child Custody Decision-Making Process, 19 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 105, 122-28 (1985).
23 FOLBERO & TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 7.
24 ROGERs & MCEWEN, supra note 14, § 11.2.
25 Nader, supra note 1, at 6-7. The discussion of the court crisis has also been used to
support other changes, such as speeding up the timetable for case disposition, limiting
discovery, and curtailing access to the federal courts. See Lauren K Robel, The Politics of
Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 115, 124-25, 136 (1991)
(discussing the reasons behind these proposed changes).
26 Nader, supra note 1, at 6.
27 Id. at 7.
28 Id. at 6.
2 9 Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don t Know
(and Think We Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REv. 4, 37-40 (1983); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L.
Rev. 3, 15 (1986).
30 Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes, supra note 29, at 69.
3 1id. at42.
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crimes, along with the war on drugs, has substantially increased the
workload of federal trial courts. 32 Some lawyers and judges share the
perception that increased criminal caseloads, paired with inadequate
funding, have led to unreasonable delays in the disposition of civil cases. 33
Galanter also notes that the number of federal court appeals has increased
significantly in recent years, surpassing the increase in judicial resources.34
The current burdens on the judiciary should make out-of-court resolution
very attractive to courts, although for more innocuous reasons than Nader
posits.
Finally, Professor Nader points to the limited voluntary use of
mediation to support her argument that mediation is being forced down the
throats of an unwilling populace. 35 Although this position has surface
appeal, there are many other possible reasons for limited voluntary use.
Commentators note that inaccurate perceptions and inadequate
knowledge about mediation may cause resistance to its use. 36 Research
indicates that individuals' attitudes about mediation become more favorable
as a result of reading informational literature.37
Another argument advanced to explain resistance to mediation is that,
by the time a dispute is aired publically, many people want retribution,
vindication, or punishment of the other party to the conflict. 38 The desire
for retribution can be related to how one party views the cause of the other
party's offending behavior. If one party views the source of the dispute as a
characteristic of the opponent, rather than an external factor, the offended
3 2 John Flynn Rooney, Federal Judges Launch New Salvo on Crime Bill, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Mar. 14, 1994, at 1; Is U.S. Justice System In a State of Crisis?, NAT. L.J., Aug. 2,
1993, at 23; Steve Albert, Ninth Circuit Rethinks Its Bid for Ten More Judges, LEGAL TIMES,
Aug. 16, 1993, at 11; Daniel Wise, U.S. Judges are Wary of Fallout From Crime Bill:
Concern That New Crimes Could Swamp the Courts, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 7, 1993, at 1; Robel,
supra note 25, at 124-25.
33 Is U.S. Justice System In a State of Crisis?, supra note 32. But see Robel, supra note
25, at 118, 124-25 (noting that not all courts experience delay and that average case
processing time is not exorbitant).
34 Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes, supra note 29, at 38.
35 Nader, supra note 1, at 9.
36 Ellen S. Cohn & Mae Lynn Neyhart, Factors Affecting Public Acceptance of
Mediation, in COMMUNITY MEDIATION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS AND RESEARCHERS
167, 170-71 (Karen G. Duffy et al. eds., 1991); David E. Matz, Why Disputes Don't Go to
Mediation, MEDIATION Q., Fall 1987, at 3, 4.
37 Cohn & Neyhart, supra note 36, at 170.
38 Dean E. Peachey, What People Want from Mediation, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE
PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION 300, 303 (Kenneth Kressel et
al. eds., 1989); Matz, supra note 36, at 4.
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party is more apt to seek revenge. 39 Because mediation relies on consensus,
the prospect of a mediated settlement would rarely satisfy a participant
desiring retribution.40
Communication between participants during mediation can cause a
party to change his or her perceptions about the cause of another's behavior
and about the need for retribution. However, a party to a dispute may not be
able to anticipate developing a different view of the situation before actually
experiencing mediation. Merely reading informative literature concerning
mediation is unlikely to change desire for retribution. The high satisfaction
rates reported by mediation participants41 indicate that experience is the best
teacher.
Disputants may also approach mediation with significant doubts about
the possibilities of success. By the time the parties reach the courts or the
mediation room, many have already tried and failed to resolve the
disagreement themselves. Not surprisingly, people may feel that further
discussion will be futile. 42 Settlement rates in mediation show that
participants' initial pessimism about the utility of the process is often
unfounded. 43 Mediation often works when unassisted negotiations have
failed. Again, experiencing success in mediation would be far more
effective than abstract information about settlement rates in changing
initially resistant attitudes.
Parties to a dispute often strongly believe in the propriety of their
actions under their conception of justice. Members of the public may
perceive the court's role as seeking and declaring truth, 44 and hence, justice.
Mediation offers no similar result. If a party wants a ruling from an
authority figure as to right and wrong, mediation is an unattractive option.
Interestingly, legal professionals tend to describe the courts as avenues of
3 9 Peachey, supra note 38, at 311-12. Cohn & Neyhart, supra note 36, at 177.
40 Peachey, supra note 38, at 306.
4 1 Jeanne A. Clement & Andrew I. Schwebel, A Research Agenda for Divorce
Mediation: The Creation of Second Order Knowledge to Inform Legal Policy, 9 Omo ST. J.
ON Disp. REsoL. 95, 98-99 (1993); Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small C/aims
Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REv. 237, 256-60 (1981); Janice
A. Roebl & Royer F. Cook, Mediation in Interpersonal Disputes: Effectiveness and
Limitations, in MEDLATION RESRARCH: Tm PROCESS AND EFECrIvENESS OF THIRD PARTY
INTERVENTION 31, 33 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds., 1989); Roars & McEWEN, supra note
14, § 3.3 n.44 (Supp. 1993).
4 2 Matz, supra note 36, at 4-5.
43 Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. Pruitt, Conclusion: A Research Perspective on the
Mediation of Social Conflict, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFEcrIVENESS OF
THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION 394, 397 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds., 1989).
44 Cohn & Neyhart, supra note 36, at 171.
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dispute resolution,45 a vision identical to the prevailing view of the function
of mediation.
Psychological factors may make mediation initially unappealing. Few
people look forward to direct confrontation with others. Seeking resolution
through an agent, or avoidance, is more comfortable than dealing with
problems directly. In addition, disputants outside the court system may be
embarrassed to admit that they need help to resolve their problems. An
additional, very persuasive theory advanced to explain resistance to the use
of mediation by disputants concerns the development of a "metadispute," or
a dispute about the manner in which the underlying conflict was handled by
the other parties.46 For example, if one party presents a claim to another,
and the other rejects the claim, the denail of relief can have an impact upon
how the initiating party views both the responding disputant and the claim.
The formation of another layer in the dispute increases the number of issues
and the emotional involvement of the parties.47 In turn, this increases the
likelihood of party formation of erroneous attributions. It also intensifies the
desire for retribution and vindication. These attitudes reduce the likelihood
that disputants would initially seek out mediation, even though mediation
can result in resolution of the problems. 48
Limited voluntary utilization does not necessarily support Professor
Nader's assumption that people do not like what mediation offers. There are
several other possible explanations for participant resistance to mediation.
Settlement and satisfaction rates in mediation indicate that people who
understand and experience mediation do find it valuable.
In sum, the shift away from litigation as the predominant method of
resolving conflicts can be interpreted in more than one way. Professor
Nader chooses to argue that the growing use of, and support for, alternative
dispute resolution reflects a hierarchical conspiracy to suppress conflict. The
alternative dispute resolution movement can also be interpreted to represent
a rebalancing of social values towards a more cooperative orientation, away
from the focus on individual rights characteristic of the 1960s.49 Professor
Nader does not discuss the implications or wisdom of this possible shift in
values, yet this is an important issue. Perhaps, as Professor Sally Engle
Merry notes, the organizational complexity of modem life and concomitant
45 Simon H. Rifiind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, in THE POUND
CONFERENCE, supra note 19, at 51, 56. See also Cohn & Neyhart, supra note 36, at 171-72.
46 Craig A. McEwen & Thomas W. Milburn, Explaining a Paradox of Mediation, 9
NEGOTIATION J. 23, 26 (1993).
47 id.
48 Id.
49 Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology and the Study of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 34
J. LEGAL EDUC. 277, 282 (1984).
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need for societal stability may be endangered by confrontation."s Mediation
may also be an attractive option for resolving disputes without a
determination of which participant's value system will prevail. This might
be a benefit in our increasingly multicultural society. 51
B. Does Mediation Suppress Conflict?
Professor Nader fears that mediation practices are inherently coercive,
especially to historically powerless and disenfranchised groups, such as
women and people of color.52 A brief overview of mediation theory and
practice precedes discussion of these concerns.
1. The Process and Purpose of Mediation
There are many ways to settle a dispute. Parties can ignore or avoid a
problem, talk informally among themselves, or hire agents to negotiate a
resolution. If negotiation does not work, disputants can call in a mediator to
help structure the discussions. If no consensual settlement can be reached,
parties may submit the matter to arbitration, or take the case to trial,
allowing a third party to decide the matter.
Mediation is basically a negotiation between disputants facilitated by a
disinterested third party with no authority to issue a decision. 53 Mediation
sessions are private, and most mediators attempt to protect the
confidentiality of the communications.54 Although no two mediators can be
expected to agree completely on a standard definition of mediation, most
would concur that certain essential elements distinguish the process. First,
all the parties to the dispute must be given the opportunity to express their
points of view fully. Next, the issues separating the parties must be defined.
Negotiations then begin in order to see if the competing interests of the
parties can be accommodated in a mutually agreeable manner. 55
Successful mediations often deal not only with the issues initially stated
by the parties, but also with the underlying issues or root causes of the
50 Merry, supra note 49, at 283.
5 1 Id. at 282.
52 Nader, supra note 1, at 4.
5 3 See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 14, § 3.3, at 20-21 and NANCY H. ROGERS &
RIcHARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GuiDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAw, 7-39 (1987), for a
general overview of the mediation process and further citations.
54 See ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 14, §§ 8.1 and 8.2, for a brief overview of
confidentiality.
55 RoGERs & McEWEN, supra note 14, § 3.3; ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 53, at 7-
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conflict.5 6 Many mediators attempt to avoid positional bargaining, in which
disputants insist on attaining a certain result before carefully thinking about
their own needs or fully listening to the concerns of the other parties. 57
Instead, mediators often try to focus the parties' attention on meeting their
underlying interests or needs, and searching for mutual gain wherever
possible. 58 Mediation attempts to alter the parties' initial perceptions of
what they wish to gain from the dispute. No change in the positions of the
parties can be attained, and no settlement reached, if the parties fail to shift
their perception of the strength of their case, or fail to appreciate the merits
of their opponent's arguments.5 9
Mediation can be strictly voluntary, or can be accompanied by
pressures or mandates. 60 Mandatory mediation generally means that the
parties must at least meet for a mediation. Some jurisdictions also require
some form of payment. 61
Mandates to use mediation can be accompanied by pressures to settle,
such as delay in a party's ability to file suit, financial disincentives of going
to trial, and public disclosure or mediator reports to the court.62 Settlement
pressure reflects the justice system's goal of reducing the number of cases
going to trial. 63 The system's goal is inconsistent with the parties' interest
in unfettered access to the courts, absent truly voluntary settlement. 64
Pressures to settle have been poorly received by professional groups
and policy makers. 65 However, pressures will probably remain attractive to
the courts.
2. Public Policy and the Mediator's Power
To show the alleged dangers of mediation, Nader draws heavily from
56 FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 8; ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 53, at 9-10.
5 7 ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 53, at 27.
58 CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 38-39 (1986).
59 ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 53, at 10, 11.
60 Id. at 17-18.
61 ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 14, § 5.3.
6 2 Id. § 7.1.
63 Id.
64Id. § 7.5.
6 5 CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., NATIONAL
STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1992)
§§ 5.1(b), at 6, and 11.3, at 9; SOCIETY FOR PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
REPORT No. 1 OF THE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY COMMITTEE, MANDATED PARTICIPATION
AND SETTLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS 16
(1991).
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an article by Trina Grillo discussing the use (or, more accurately, misuse) of
mandatory mediation in some California divorce courts. 66 Both authors
believe that the promised benefit of mediation has not been realized. 67
Two aspects of mediation must be examined when inquiring into the
potentially coercive effects of the process. First, broad policy issues affect
choices of program design. Second, an individual mediator's behavior has
an effect upon the actions of the parties. The two issues are interrelated,
since policy decisions can affect mediator actions.
The California mediation statute mandates participation in mediation
when parents cannot agree about child custody. 68 The courts provide the
mediator, 69 and sessions are private and confidential. 70 The mediator can
exclude the parties' attorneys from the sessions. 71 If the participants do not
reach an agreement, the mediator may make a recommendation to the judge
concerning custody or visitation of the children.72
Several aspects of the California custody mediation program present
serious problems. First, taken in context, California's confidentiality
provisions are problematic. Confidentiality is meant to foster free
discussion. It also results in nondisclosure of information about what occurs
in mediation sessions. To counterbalance the unavailability of information
exchanged during mediation, mediators are generally not granted power to
decide the outcome of a conflict. 73 This arrangement protects both the
parties' interests in access to the courts and the public's interest in access to
information about the judicial decision-making process.
California's custody mediation scheme fails to properly balance the
competing interest of privacy in mediation with the interests of the parties
and the public. Permitting the mediator to give an opinion to the judge gives
the mediator too much power over a party he or she dislikes or perceives as
uncooperative. The role of the mediator is to structure settlement
discussions, not decide the case. Not all mediators disagree with
California's approach. Commentators have indicated that a mediator's
ability to make reports to the court when the parties do not settle may
6 6 Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545 (1991).
67 M at 1551; Nader, supra note 1, at 11.
68 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(a) (West 1983).
69 Id. § 4607(b).
70 Id. § 4607(c).
71 Id. § 4607(a).
72 Id. § 4607(e).
73 In an exception to this general rule, in what is known as "med-arb," the parties first
try to resolve the dispute with the assistance of a traditional mediator. If negotiations fail, the
mediator can make a decision as an arbitrator. See ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 14, § 7.1.
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actually motivate parties to work more productively in mediation. 74 These
advocates of reporting do not address the implications of what may be
contained in the mediator's report. Reports concerning behavior which
frustrates productive negotiation can theoretically be distinguished from
reports recommending an outcome. However, reports based upon
participant behavior pose a risk of decisionmaling based upon emotion
rather than law and evidence.
Mediators are not well-equipped to make informed decisions. They do
not conduct thorough investigations into the family situation. They cannot
perform in-depth psychological assessments of the parents and children to
determine parental competence and children's adjustment. This job is best
left to mental health professionals who have the time and resources to
conduct comprehensive evaluations.
If the judge is likely to accept the mediator's opinion, a mediator can
effectively coerce a reluctant party into agreeing to his or her custody
recommendation. Contesting the mediator's recommendation can be time-
consuming and expensive, and the risk of loss may be high. Under these
circumstances, a parent may simply give up the fight.75
Granting the mediator power to exclude attorneys from mediation
sessions is also unwise. The risk of an essentially involuntary "agreement"
is exacerbated if the mediator forbids attorney involvement. Attorneys are
required to protect their clients' interests, 76 but this job is frustrated when
lawyers are denied access to settlement discussions. 7
7
The California mandatory custody mediation system places the courts'
interest in docket control ahead of the parties' interest in free choice of
settlement or trial. 78 Wisely, the California system has not been widely
74 Kenneth Kressel et al., Research in Contested Custody Mediations: An Illustration of
the Case Study Method, MEDIATION Q., Summer 1989, at 55, 67 (citing Neil B. McGillicuddy
et al., Third Party Intervention: A Field Experiment Comparing Three Different Models, 53 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 104, 104 (1987)).
75 In McLaughlin v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. Rptr. 479, 481 (1983), the court held that
a mediator making a custody recommendation to the court is subject to cross-examination.
7 6 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7, EC-7-1, 7-4 (1981) (a
lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law).
77 This exclusionary policy may be in response to criticism of lawyers as frustrating
progress in mediation by taking an adversarial stance. In my experience as a mediator in small
claims and municipal court in Franklin County, Ohio, although attorneys can be obstructive in
some cases, attorneys can also be helpful to the process. There is not enough evidence that the
presence of lawyers is obstructive to support a policy of blanket exclusion.
78 In San Francisco, mandatory mediation significantly dropped the number of full
contested visitation and custody trials from an average of 275 a year to 3 a year from 1977 to
1980. Michelle Deis, Note, California's Answer: Mandatory Mediation of Custody and
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copied. 79 Most mediation programs have been structured to protect the
parties' choice of whether to settle. Criticism of all mediation programs and
processes as coercive, based upon one poorly structured example, is
overbroad.
Turning from public policy to the practice of mediation, Professors
Nader and Grillo focus heavily on aspects of mediator behavior which they
feel can result in unfair settlements. Both criticize mediation for ignoring
both the fault and the context of the dispute of women's anger, and for
treating men and women as equal when, in fact, women are less powerful
than their husbands. 80 While mediation is not perfect, these criticisms are
themselves subject to critical analysis.8 '
Professor Grillo's article is based upon mediation sessions she has
either observed or had reported to her. 82 No statistical information is
presented. Although observation and reflection are excellent ways to detect
problems, it is impossible to tell how common identified mediator behavior
is without more information.
Professors Nader and Grillo assert that the California child custody
mediators pay insufficient attention to the background of the parents'
conflict over the children. 83 Mediators do need to understand the facts
giving rise to a dispute. However, the mediator's role differs from the roles
assumed by advocates and negotiators. The mediator's goal is to help people
resolve a problem. The goal of the advocate or negotiator is to persuade a
decision-maker or opponent of the merits of their case in order to obtain a
favorable outcome. These different roles require mediators to use facts in a
different way.
Mediators use the factual statements of the parties in order to
accomplish two major purposes. One purpose is to develop understanding
between the parties about the way past events have made each party feel.
This creates empathy in place of blame and anger. Neither party must
abandon their own perspective, but understanding each other's point of view
creates momentum towards settlement. This momentum is furthered by the
Wsitation Disputes, 1 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 149, 158, 160 (1985).
7 9 See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 14, § 7.1 (citing Family Disputes: Hawaii,
Florida, and California Courts Maintain Statewide Family Mediation, 3 Alternative Disp.
Resol. Rep. (BNA) 335, 337 (Sept. 28, 1989)) (33 California counties permit mediator
recommendations and 21 counties do not).
80 Grillo, supra note 66, at 1567, 1569-72, 1574-77; Nader, supra note 1, at 11, 13.
81 See Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 467 (1991),
for a detailed analysis of Professor Grillo's article, reaching conclusions similar to the ones
presented here.
82 Grillo, supra note 66, at 1551 n.13.
83 Id. at 1564; Nader, supra note 1, at 11.
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rapport generated by the mediator's empathetic comprehension of each
party's perspectives. Mediators also use information about the context of the
dispute to shape a resolution that helps to avoid repetition of past problems.
No one can change history, but a mediator, informed by an understanding
of the past, can help improve future interactions.
Any good litigator or negotiator understands that mastering the facts of
a case is crucial to good job performance. In contrast, a mediator does not
have to be in total command of the facts in order to be competent at
facilitating settlement. The feelings generated by the facts are more useful to
the mediator than total comprehension of the facts in searching for
resolution. In addition, many of the factors influencing parties to settle are
independent of the facts. Factors influencing a decision to settle may include
the cost of continued litigation, a party's assessment of the likelihood of
success at trial, risk avoidance, and a desire to get on with one's life.
Nader and Grillo also criticize mediation for failing to allocate fault. 84
This criticism challenges the basic premise of neutrality as a critical
component of mediation. Although neutrality is often espoused without
clear definition or critical examination, the term usually means that a
mediator will not decide who wins a case, and will not align himself or
herself with one disputant. 85
Without overt institutional pressures to settle, a mediator generally
cannot determine the outcome of a conflict. However, mediators often have
a good deal of influence over the parties. Mediators may have strong
feelings about the relative merits of disputes, including feelings about who
may be at fault. A mediator can effectively legitimize one party's position at
the expense of an other's, or can legitimize all parties' perceptions for
different reasons. The mediator's actions necessarily have an impact on the
outcome of the case.
As often occurs in mediation, the mediator must make judgment calls
about whether his or her own reactions to a disputant are based on
unsupportable bias, such as race, class, or personality, or on generally
accepted societal values. While a mediator should take care to avoid
prejudice, no mediator is ever value-free. The difficult issue is how to
discuss fault in a way that facilitates, rather than derails, resolution.
In most cases, a mediator gains little and risks much by casting blame.
The mediator may mistakenly allocate fault, thereby preventing a party's
acceptance of the process. A mediator seldom has the tools necessary to
determine who is telling the truth in a factual dispute. Mediators normally
work only with the parties and their attorneys. They may review documents,
84 Grillo, supra note 66, at 1567; Nader, supra note 1, at 13.
85 Janet Rifkin et al., Toward a New Discourse for Mediation: A Critique of Neutrality, 9
MEDIATION Q. 151, 152 (1991).
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but they rarely speak with witnesses. Not surprisingly, this lack of detailed
evidence means that a mediator's reactions to a party may be wrong or
incomplete. Assessing blame is dangerous under these conditions.
A mediator's expression of opinion about fault also risks derailing
resolution by angering the blamed party. Allocation of fault by the mediator
is unnecessary if the blamed parties agree they were at fault. Therefore,
there is no need to assess blame unless the participants deny fault, at least to
some degree. A judge runs no risk in allocating fault, since judicial decision
is imposed by fiat, not attained by mutual agreement. However, a mediated
settlement hinges upon consensus, which is unlikely to emerge if a party is
angered by the mediator's alignment with another participant.8 6
A mediator can be most effective by ensuring that each party
understands the other party's arguments about fault. When the parties
understand each other's feelings, they can assess the merit of the arguments
and decide whether to modify their own positions in response. If one party's
position is unsupportable, the mediator can indicate that he or she sees the
other party's point, which is a more gentle and less dangerous way of
communicating a judgment as to fault based on societal values.
Nader and Grillo also criticize mediation for failing to allow the
expression of women's anger. 87 They state that mediators repress discussion
of feelings, whereas trial facilitates the release of anger. 88 Both postulate
that suppressing anger is dangerous to womens' mental health, and that
expressing anger through surrogates at trial is cathartic. 89 Assuming that
venting anger is psychologically beneficial, the available research does not
support the assertion that mediation, compared to trial, is more likely to
repress expression of anger. The studies indicate that, in general, the
reverse is true. A study of small claims mediation shows that participant
anger was more likely to increase during trial than in mediation, and that
greater numbers of mediation participants felt less upset at the conclusion of
mediation, compared to the group in adjudication.9" A study of divorce
mediation and adjudication also found that anger levels increased during
86 In a divorce case, it seems odd to criticize mediators for failing to allocate fault when
the divorce laws have moved away from the concept of fault. The trend in America is clearly
towards no-fault divorce. Not only does fault no longer have to be shown to get a divorce, but
fault is now less commonly a factor in the provision of alimony and division of property than
in the past. J. Thomas Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1091, 1095
(1992) (book review).
87 Grillo, supra note 66, at 1576-79; Nader, supra note 1, at 13, 14.
88 Grillo, supra note 66, at 1572-76; Nader, supra note 1, at 11-12.
89 Grillo, supra note 66, at 1573; Nader, supra note 1, at 13, 14.
9 0 MCEWEN & MAIMAN, supra note 40, at 256.
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trial. 91 If women can express anger at trial, but not in mediation, and if the
expression of anger is therapeutic and leads to healing, levels of anger
should usually end up lower after trial than at the close of mediation. This is
not the case.
Actually, psychological reserach questions the common assumption that
expression of anger is beneficial. The effect of venting anger depends upon
the situation and especially upon the reaction of the person receiving the
message. 2 Angry expressions are effective when they cause the offending
person to change and "clean up his act," restoring the speaker's sense of
control. 93 To be truly cathartic anger must be expressed to the cause of the
rage, be appropriate to the magnitude of the injury, and not draw
retaliation.94 Such expressions can help the speaker feel vindicated and
accomplish a social goal. 95
However, when these conditions are not met, merely ventilating anger
to others does not exorcise it. On the contrary, talking about the anger-
inspiring situations reinforces the feelings. 96 Subsequent recitals can cause
the emotions to reappear with each retelling, 97 and create greater hostility to
the object of the anger than arises in people who are not permitted to
express their hostility.98
The lessons of mediation practice further indicate that the expression of
anger can carry both benefits and risks. On the positive side, venting
feelings in mediation may be therapeutic. Speaking directly to the party
blamed for the problem is one factor required for catharsis, and may help a
participant overcome emotional blocks to the resolution of the dispute.
Further, expression of feelings may allow the listening parties to recognize
the effect of their actions on others. This realization can soften a party's
prior position by developing mutual understanding.
Expression of intense feelings can also frustrate attempts to reach a
consensual resolution. When one party continuously expresses anger toward
another, and gets no results, the anger is reawakened and reinforced. Also,
the parties against whom the anger is directed can become angry and
retaliate, especially when they feel that the other's complaints are baseless.
Unless expression of anger results in change or some understanding between
91 Joan B. Kelly, Parent Interaction After Divorce: Comparison of Mediated and
Adversarial Divorce Processes, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 387, 394 (1991).
92 CAROL TAVRIS, ANGER: THE MISUNDERSTOOD EMOTION 145 (1982).
93 Id. at 146, 149.
94 Id. at 129-30, 247.
95 Id. at 144.
96 Id. at 132.
97 TARRIs, supra note 92, at 133.
98 Id. at 133.
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the parties, with a concomitant reduction in the level of anger, it will derail
problem-solving. Therefore, mediators sometimes need to exercise control
over expression of emotion within sessions to avoid escalation of the
conflict. As often occurs in mediation, the mediator must struggle with the
issue of how best to balance the sometimes competing needs for emotional
expression and rational discussion.
Change is the key to conflict resolution.99 It is also the key to the
productive expression of anger. In voluntary dispute settlement, the change
must come from within the parties. Mediators try to influence the
participants to change. They possess skills to help correct mistaken
perceptions, ensure all parties are heard, and focus on generating solutions.
Mediation has the potential, although not always realized, to transform
anger into resolution.
In trial, change is externally imposed. If parties to a conflict do not
change perspectives themselves, they either remain in conflict or submit the
dispute to the courts for decision. Trial emphasizes one party arguing
against another, as opposed to each side listening and trying to understand
the other. The judicial decision may vindicate one party at the expense of
the other. While the winner will likely feel better, the loser may continue to
harbor anger. Trial provides a public forum for the quest for justice, but it
lacks the transformative potential of mediation. However, adjudication
serves an important purpose when parties cannot or do not wish to settle the
conflict themselves.
3. Power Imbalances In Mediation
Professor Grillo's criticisms concerning the potentially oppressive
effect of the mediation process on women are derived from a system in
which over half of the courts permit the mediator to have a great deal of
power over the resolution.10 0 The way mediation is practiced is influenced
by the context in which it occurs. For example, day-of-trial mediation in
small claims court may share some similarities with multiple-session divorce
mediation or mediation involving large, complex business disputes. The
different situations may also produce significant differences in the w~y
mediators and parties behave. It is difficult to generalize accurately about
the subtle dynamics of interaction among diverse settings. Criticisms of all
mediation programs based on the California system may be inaccurate. The
dynamics of the mediation process should differ greatly where mediators
have no ability to recommend the outcome of the case to the court.
99 GERALD WILIAMs, OHio CLE INSTITuTE, NEGOTIATION AND SETLEMENT IN THE
90s: NEWmDIMENSIONS FOR LAwYERS 86 (4th ed. 1992).
100 Grillo, supra note 66, at 1555.
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In spite of these risks, Professor Nader expands Professor Grillo's
concerns about mandatory custody mediation in California to cover all cases
in which she discerns an imbalance of power between the participants. She
seems to believe that all mediation, not just mandatory mediation, is
dangerous, except among equals. 101 Other critics of mediation question the
fairness of the process for minorities, women, and the poor. 1°2 These
commentators use adjudication as the benchmark for comparisons of
fairness.1 03
There is no question that American society is filled with diversity.
People of many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds co-exist, often
uneasily. Women and members of racial and ethnic minorities have often
been denied opportunities available to majority men. In addition, women
and members of other culturally different groups may think and feel
differently than white men. Gender and cultural differences may create
disadvantages for minorities and women in mediation. Women and
minorities also tend to have fewer financial resources than many majority
men. Economic disparities among people of the same cultural background
and gender might also cause power imbalances.
Two major issues arise in any discussion of ethnic and gender
differences in mediation. First, one must examine the extent to which
beliefs about differences are based upon accurate generalizations or upon
unsupported stereotypes. Second, one must look at the extent to which even
accurate generalizations about group differences cause unfairness to group
members. In theory, differences could cause the mediation process to be
unfair, could create unfair results, or both.
The fairness of mediation cannot be examined in a vacuum. Both the
processes and outcomes of mediation should be examined in relation to the
fairness of the other available dispute resolution processes. Most
commentators compare the fairness of mediation to the fairness of trial. 104
This dualism ignores the fact that the vast majority of disputes entering the
legal system are settled through negotiation. Accordingly, the advantages
and disadvantages of mediation should be compared to the pros and cons of
both negotiation and litigation.
I Concerns about the equity of mediation for traditionally disadvantaged
groups arise from three different, but often interrelated, sources. First, the
effects of the gender and cultural differences themselves may increase the
risks of unfairness in mediation. For example, women have been described
101 Nader, supra note 1, at 5.
102 Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 5 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1367-91 (1985).
103 Id. at 1367-75.
104 Delgado et al., supra note 102, at 1367-75.
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as being more relationship oriented than men, while men are more
competitive. 105 In a conflict, this difference might influence women to
accommodate the wishes of other participants and thus achieve less desirable
outcomes for themselves. A person from a culture which emphasizes polite
behavior may be more reticent than an American in voicing criticism in
mediation, leaving issues to simmer. 
106
Second, deeply ingrained societal prejudice against minorities and
women can make informal dispute resolution unfair to these groups.
Theories suggesting a potential for unequal outcomes for both women and
minorities in mediation include the possibilities that mediators are biased,
that bias flourishes in informal settings, that the mediator helps or
acquiesces in the exercise of domination by members of majority groups,
and that minorities and women believe they will be disadvantaged in any
forum, so they accept unfair results as part of a self-fulfilling prophecy.1
0 7
Power imbalances are a third source of concern for critics of mediation.
Informal dispute resolution has been criticized for denying access to justice,
operating to the disadvantage of less powerful parties, and removing energy
from efforts at systemic reform. 108
What do .we really know about cultural and gender differences and
power imbalances? Within the dispute resolution field, a number of articles
have been written about differences in negotiating behavior among different
nationalities. 10 9 However, review of the literature on cultural differences
between sub-groups in America shows the relative paucity of knowledge, as
opposed to theory, in this area.' 10
Many difficulties arise in attempts to determine accurately
characteristics of different cultural minorities in America. Acculturation is
one major variable. Groups differ in rates of integration, depending on
factors such as length of time in the country, pre-existing cultural traits,
105 See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoicE 24-63 (1982). If a woman
does have a more relational sense of self than her male opponent, and this sense of self results
in her giving up more than a man in mediation or negotiation than in litigation, we need to
think of the implications of telling this woman to change her value system. Requiring the
woman to go to trial rather than settle seems to reinforce patriarchy.
106 q. MCHELLE LEBARON DURYEA, Uvic INSTITUTE FOR DIsPUTE RESOLUTION,
CONFLICT AND CULTURE: A LrERATURE REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 44-45 (1992).
107 Delgado et al., supra note 102, at 1375-85; MICHELE HERMANN El" AL., THE
METRO COURT PRomcr FINAL REPORT, Jan. 1993, xxvi-xxix, 3.
108 Delgado et al., supra note 102, at 1391-1402.
109 See, e.g., Thomas Flannigan, Negotiating With the Japanese, CBA REc. June 1989
at 6, 26; Danian Zhang & Kenji Kuroda, Beware of Japanese Negotiation Syle: How to
Negotiate With Japanese Companies, 10 Nw. J. INT L'L. & Bus. 2, 195-212 (19xx).
110 See generally DURYEA, supra note 106.
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language facility, employment opportunities, economic status, group
cohesion, family structure, and community makeup. Members of groups
with similar backgrounds may be dissimilar in certain respects. For
example, although Hispanics are generally grouped together as an ethnic
group, some Spanish-surnamed Americans came from Cuba, others from
Portugal, Spain, Puerto Rico or South America, and others from Mexico.
Geographic distribution may influence groups in different ways. Hispanics
living in the Southwest might find both similarities and differences with
others located in Florida, the Midwest, or the East Coast. To date, studies
attempting to accurately identify shared cultural traits of American sub-
groups are noticeably lacking. I
In the absence of data, but with an awareness of the need for mediators
to be alert issues relating to cultural diversity, some commentators have
attempted to sketch out culturally related characteristics that may surface in
mediation. For example, writers have suggested that Asian participants tend
to "ask [the] mediator for advice as a higher authority. "112 This tendency is
not ascribed to Iranians. 113 Experience shows that these suggestions must be
taken with a grain of salt. The Mediation program at The Ohio State
University"14 handled two disputes involving recent immigrants from the
Middle East 15 and one case involving two Chinese disputants. In both
cases, the Middle Eastern participants asked the mediator what they should
do. In the case involving the Asian parties, neither asked the mediator for
advice - and neither party showed any willingness to compromise, in spite
of the traditional use of mediation in Chinese society. 116
Theories of differences based on gender also lack empirical support.
This is not to say that posited distinctions between the sexes do not exist.
The problem is that we simply do not know much about the accuracy or
pervasiveness of perceived gender differences. In addition, characteristics
that may generally be more strongly emphasized in women are not totally
111 DURYEA, supra note 106, at 31; Susan B. Goldstein, Cultural Issues in Mediation: A
Literature Review 1, 2 (1986), PCR Working Paper.
112 FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 323.
113 id
114 These cases were mediated by students from the Ohio State University College of
Law Mediation Seminar and Practicum. Cases were referred from the Franklin County, Ohio,
Municipal Court System through the pre-filing mediation program and day-of-trial court
referrals.
115 We did not check for exact nationality.
116 FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 1-2; Joan Kelly, Mediation in China: A
Fresh Look, MEDIATION NEws (Academy of Family Mediators), Spring, 1994, at 6; Merry,
supra note 49, at 279.
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lacking in men.11 7 People are capable of a vast range of behavior.
Individuals differ markedly within all groups. In any given situation, it
is difficult to distinguish accurately between behavior that may be caused by
cultural characteristics and behavior that results from individual
idiosyncracies. Without further research, assumptions of group-based
distinctions risk over-reliance on stereotypes.
An example drawn from an actual case illustrates the dangers of over-
reliance upon theories of difference. A few years ago, a mediation student
was reading Carol Gilligan's book, In a Different Voice. We were engaged
in a lively discussion of the book until the cases were called. That day, we
mediated a dispute between two young African-American college men. In
the discussion, one party focused on right and wrong, relied on the rule of
law to support his position, ignored feelings arising out of the past
relationship, and dismissed attempts to discuss the large context of the
dispute - a stereotypically "masculine" approach. 118 The other participant
focused on the past relationship between the two, looked at the whole
picture of the dispute, including aspects totally lacking in legal relevance,
did not feel right and wrong were easily defined, and was far more
concerned about his feelings and gaining his opponent's approval than the
other man - a stereotypically "feminine" approach. 119 The case caused
both of us to examine claims of group-based cultural differences with a
more critical eye. Later, it occurred to me that each party had made the
argument that was most persuasive for his side, given the facts and the law
of the case. Perhaps each man chose the negotiating approach most
beneficial to his interest in the dispute. The behavior we observed may have
been due less to natural inclination than to strategic choice.
Mediators have begun to show concern about the influence of cultural
and gender issues in mediation. To date, most attempts to foster fairness to
members of all groups in mediation have focused on creating mediator
awareness of differences and eliminating mediator bias through sensitivity
training.120 Attempts to reduce mediator prejudice and to foster mediator
awareness of behavioral differences which may be culturally determined are
certainly steps in the right direction. Unfortunately, this approach has flaws.
First, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of attempts to reduce
mediator prejudice. Second, the lack of solid knowledge about defining
differences limits the utility of this approach to reducing bias and attaining
117 See generally GILLIGAN, supra note 105.
118 Id. at 24-63.
119 Id.
120 DURYEA, supra note 106, at 53; John Paul Lederach, Training on Culture: Four
Approaches, CONCILIATION Q., Winter, 1990, at 6, 11-13.
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fairness. 121 It is practically impossible to suggest ways to approach cultural
differences when we do not have a good understanding of what the
differences are, or how those differences are manifested in behavior. Third,
sensitivity training certainly does nothing to discern and eliminate
disadvantages to participants that may arise from the structure of the
mediation process itself.
Researchers have begun to examine issues of fairness in mediation. To
date, the little data that is available focuses on mediated outcomes in
comparison to litigated outcomes in similar cases. Comparisons of mediated
and negotiated resolutions are lacking. Further, the few outcome studies that
have been conducted have not examined the mediation processes for
evidence of systemic bias.
Outcome studies to date have generally failed to support the theory that
women fare poorly in mediation. 122 In divorce cases, where women are
theoretically unequal to their more powerful husbands, results in mediation
are similar to results attained in litigation and negotiated settlements. The
law and legal norms seem to shape settlements, regardless of forum. 123
Mediated agreements may be more beneficial to children's interests (and
thus indirectly beneficial to women's interests), than negotiated settlements,
because mediation is more likely to result in detailed visitation
arrangements, payment of child support beyond age eighteen, and payment
of college expenses.' 24
A recent study of mediated outcomes compared to adjudicated results
in New Mexico small claims courts found that women respondents actually
fared better in mediation than in adjudication.125 With this exception,
gender of the participant in mediation or adjudication made no difference. 126
Little work has been done to test the theory that minorities will be
disadvantaged in mediation. 127 The New Mexico small claims court study
discussed above was able to examine the effect of ethnicity on mediation
121 DURYEA, supra note 106, at 53; John Paul Lederach, Training on Culture: A Survey
of the Field, CONCILIATION Q., Winter, 1990, at 4-5.
122 Nader, supra note 1, at 13.
12 3 JESSICA PEARSON, STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE FAMILY MEDIATION (A Working Paper
for the National Symposium on Court Connected Dispute Resolution Research) 17-20 (Oct.
15-16, 1993). See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979) for a discussion of bargaining
theory as informed by legal rules.
124 PEARSON, supra note 123, at 19-20.
125 Hermann et al., supra note 107, at xxii.
126 d.
127 Clement & Schwebel, supra note 41, at 106.
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results. 128 Hispanics made up the vast majority of minorities in the study
area. 129 This study found that Hispanic disputants did not fare as well in
mediation as adjudication, but that this difference disappeared when the co-
mediators were both Hispanic. 130 The adjudicative forum ameliorated, but
did not completely erase, the effect of ethnicity upon the less favorable
outcomes generally obtained by Hispanics.13 1
The results of this study have important implications for mediation. A
crucial question is why the outcomes differed. The authors of the study do
not claim to answer this question, but note that mediation has been used in
Hispanic culture for generations. Traditional mediators give opinions
concerning right and wrong.132 In the court-connected program, mediators
were trained to be neutral and withhold personal opinions. This might
undermine the Hispanic participants' sense of the merits of their case.' 33
Other possible explanations for the less favorable results experienced by
Hispanics include: bias on the part of the mediator, risk of the informal
forum to traditionally disadvantaged groups, mediator perpetuation of pre-
existing power imbalances, and lower expectations on the part of
minorities. 134
None of these hypotheses can be conclusively disproved from the data
obtained in the study. However, the hypothesis related to the use of
traditional mediation in Hispanic culture is intriguing. Women are also
viewed as disempowered and subject to discrimination in this culture. If the
disparate results were caused by mediator bias, the perpetuation of
underlying power imbalances, and self-fulfilling prophecies, it would seem
that women would also fare worse in mediation. As discussed above, this
has not been shown to be the case in the studies conducted to date.
If the study results can accurately be attributed to the culturally based
128 Hermann et al., supra note 107, at xix-xx.
1 29 Id. at xv.
1 30 1d. at xx-xxi. See Goldstein, supra note 111, at 33, 34 and DURYEA, supra note
106, at 51, 52, for a review of the counseling literature concerning cultural matching of
clients and counselors. Both note that some evidence favors cultural matching, but that other
studies indicate that factors other than cultural similarity may be more important. One
Australian study did not find a relationship between cultural matching and settlement rates in
mediation, but did not examine relative equality of the outcomes of similar cases. LINDA
FISHER & JEREMY LONG, CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND CONFLICT IN THE AUSTRALIAN
CoMMuNrTY (The Centre for Multicultural Studies Working Papers on Multiculturalism No.
11, 1991).
131 Hermann et al., supra note 107, at xix.
13 2 Id. at xxvii.
133 Id. at xxvi-xxvii.
134 Id. at xxvi-xxix.
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different expectations of Hispanics concerning mediator neutrality, it is
likely that mediators can be taught specific skills to apply in disputes
involving Hispanics in order to increase fairness. If further research shows
that process characteristics cause the less favorable outcomes, modifications
of the way mediation is conducted may help. If bias and prejudice are the
culprits, an effective remedy will be difficult to fashion; the use of
mediation in cases involving minorities will have to be re-evaluated.
Disputants should not be required or encouraged to participate in a conflict
resolution process that exacerbates unfairness.
The researchers warn that the results for Hispanics cannot be assumed
to occur in cases involving other minorities. 135 Clearly, more research needs
to be done. In particular, it would be helpful to examine whether or not
mediation results in unfavorable outcomes for African-Americans, a large
minority group.
Persons of low socio-economic status are also hypothesized to be
disadvantaged in the mediation forum. 136 Critics of informal dispute
resolution propose that mediation be reserved only for cases between
equals.' 37 If this policy is adopted, many cases would be rejected on their
face, due to commonly held perceptions of relative powerlessness.
Reserving mediation for cases between equals is not as easy to do as it
first seems. It is hard to imagine a situation in which the participants are
truly equal. When parties appear to be equal on the surface, many factors
can be used to show actual inequalities. Perhaps one businessman has more
negotiating experience than his opponent, or perhaps one white male
disputant earns more than another. With only a little imagination, the list
could be endless. The number of cases found to be appropriate for
mediation would be small. Accepting some power imbalances, such as those
operating between two white males, while rejecting others, seems
hypocritical.
Powerlessness is far too complex a phenomenon to be accurately
ascribed to a particular individual in mediation on the basis of group
membership. Individuals differ tremendously within groups. Further, to the
extent that power imbalances between disputants exist, it is reasonable to
assume that the imbalance will be expressed, to some degree, in the
resolution, no matter what process is used. Litigation and negotiation may
be no more effective than mediation in erasing power imbalances. To ask
the mediation process to correct serious, long-standing, socially-created
substantive inequities is simply unrealistic.
Attorney representation has been found to be a factor in improving
135 Herman et al., supra note 107, at 146.
136 Nader, supra note 1, at 13.
137 id.
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results for parties, both in adjudication and mediation. 131 The poor are
rarely able to afford counsel, and publicly funded legal services
organizations do not have the resources to meet the legal needs of many
low-income people. 139 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that people
with inadequate financial resources, who are unable to hire counsel, would
be vulnerable to undesirable outcomes in mediation.
Despite the risks of mediation, those unable to hire counsel may prefer
an informal process to a court trial. Self-representation in court is extremely
difficult to do effectively. Legally unsophisticated parties do not know the
rules of evidence, may not prepare the case properly, do not know how to
question and cross-examine witnesses, and are at a great disadvantage in
researching and interpreting the law. The risks to the poor in mediation
certainly do not disappear in litigation or negotiation.140
Landlord-tenant cases are given as examples of situations involving an
inherent power imbalance, 141 in which mediation should be avoided. The
Ohio State University program mediates some eviction cases.142 There is no
question that most tenants facing eviction have little power, and most are
unrepresented. In addition, Ohio law gives tenants procedural
protections, 143 but defenses to eviction based upon non-payment of rent are
few and must be raised by counterclaim. 144 If a tenant has objections to the
condition of the premises, rent escrow145 is the safest option. The powerless
138 Hermann et al., supra note 107, at 92-95. Collection cases are one category in
which legal representation does not tend to improve results for the defendants.
13 9 AMuCAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATIN AND PROFMIONAL
DEVELOPMENT: AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 47-48, 56 (1992).
140 A number of municipal court judges in our program refer cases involving a
represented party (usually the plaintiff) against an unrepresented party to mediation. From my
limited experience with these cases, I think a reasonably legally sophisticated mediator can at
times assist the unrepresented party in obtaining a more satisfactory resolution in comparison
to situations in which that party is left on his or her own to negotiate a solution with the
attorney. Not surprisingly, attorney resistance to referral of cases to mediation is common in
these types of cases.
141 Hermann et al., supra note 107, at 3-4 citing Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and
Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 5 Wis. L. Rv.
1359 (1985)).
14 2 Usually the court refers cases when both parties are unrepresented.
143 See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ '1923.04 (notice and service), 1923.06 (summons),
1923.07 (proceedings if defendant fails to appear), 1923.10 (trial by jury) (Baldwin's 1994).
144 Oto REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.061(B) (Baldwin's 1994).
145 OHIo REv. CODE § 5321.07(B)(1) (Baldwin's 1988). See Martins Ferry Jaycee
Housing, Inc. v. Pawlaczyk, 448 N.E.2d 512 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (disallowing testimony
regarding condition of the premises as a defense to an eviction action filed for non-payment of
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position of the tenant is a reflection of society's choice to protect the
landlord's interest in receiving rent, with little attention given to the reasons
for the tenant's non-payment. The effects of this policy decision are
reflected in eviction court decisions. Not surprisingly, mediation generally
can do little to significantly change the status quo. A landlord who knows
he can do well in court is unlikely to give up this advantage in mediation.
Experience teaches that there is a risk that an unsophisticated mediator
will unwittingly do nothing to challenge domination of the negotiations by
the more powerful party, thus perpetuating imbalances. However, even a
naive mediator is unlikely to leave the tenant in any worse position than
would result from unassisted negotiations.
Power has many sources, both from inside and outside the individual.
Differences in personality are important. Some people take risks; others are
risk-averse. People differ in negotiating experience and effectiveness.
Wealth, status, and education are sources of power. Public opinion can be a
source of influence. Legal rights are a major source of power. For example,
a wealthy, risk-taking party who does not fear public opinion can spend
plenty of money prosecuting a losing lawsuit, hoping to force the other
party into an undeserved settlement. A consumer armed with statutes
providing for treble damages and attorney fees may be able to aggressively
litigate or favorably settle a dispute with a small business.
Some examples drawn from actual cases handled in The Ohio State
University program may help illustrate the points discussed above. Our
program handled a product delivery dispute between a customer and a
business. Due to a misunderstanding concerning payment arrangements, the
consumer stopped payment on the check and refused delivery. The terms of
the sales contract made it highly probable that the business would win in
litigation. However, the business owner was very concerned with
maintaining good customer relations. When an apology and promise to
deliver the next day did not satisfy the customer, the owner gave her a free
upgrade to a much more expensive item, a promise of its personal delivery,
and individualized use instruction and monitoring. The legally and factually
"powerless" consumer ended up with a far better outcome than she ever
could have obtained in court.
We also mediated a dispute between a professional, white male landlord
and a much younger, less educated, less wealthy, black male tenant. The
dispute arose, in part, over costs incurred by the tenant when he was forced
to vacate the apartment for a few days while a utility service made repairs.
The landlord was not at fault for the disruption in the provision of the
utility. Even so, the tenant left mediation with a favorable settlement.
The cases recounted above may be atypical. Perhaps further study will
rent).
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show that mediation is too dangerous to the disadvantaged to continue its
use. However, the evidence to date does not warrant the wholesale
abandonment of mediation as a dispute resolution technique. The factors
influencing power and powerlessness also influence the outcomes of
litigation and negotiation. None of these factors disappear in the mediation
setting. The forum in which the dispute is resolved does not necessarily
shift pre-existing power differentials. Denying mediation based upon the
assumption of difference or powerlessness will remove an avenue of dispute
resolution from some people who would like and benefit from it.
Critics of mediation also fear that piecemeal settlements of systemic
problems will sap the collective energy needed to generate broad social
change. The privacy of the process can hide widespread problems from
public view. Individual resolutions remove an impetus to organize for larger
changes. 146
Grassroots efforts at social change can create benefits for many.
Mediated settlements may benefit only a few. However, individual
settlements have advantages. Pressing for generalized solutions has
disadvantages. Large scale organizing is complex and takes a lot of time.
The responding party may be more resistant to implement changes for large
scale problems than to resolve one dispute without creating a precedent.
Persons who forego individual settlements to advocate for a group solution
may end up sacrificing their immediate interests for the hope of future
collective gain. 147 They may not wish to take this risk.
Jennifer Beer notes that participants in mediation lack interest in cases
similar to their own, except as validation for their own claims.148 Others use
evidence of widespread problems as one more reason to be hopeless about
crafting an effective long-term solution. 149 These attitudes indicate that
apathy is a complex problem. The availability of mediation does not
threaten a non-existent interest in group advocacy.
C. Mediation, Mind Control, and Lawyers
Professor Nader wonders why lawyers have been so quick to embrace
mediation. 150 She explains the asserted co-optation of lawyers by drawing
an analogy between the promotion of mediation and the suppression of
146 BEER, supra note 15, at 220.
147 Richard Hofrichter, Neighborhood Justice and the Social Control Problems of
American Capitalism: A Perspective, in I THE PoLxrics OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 207, 240 (R.
Abeled ed., 1982).
148 BEER, supra note 15, at 220.
149 id.
150 Nader, supra note 1, at 1.
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discord and emphasis on conformity found in large law firm culture. 5 1 She
hypothesizes that the culture of large law firms suppresses the expression of
criticism of working conditions by young associates.' 5 2 This silencing of
dissent leads to bum-out and inability to defend one's own profession
against attack by advocates of private, informal dispute resolution. 153 The
accuracy of the assumption that lawyers have rushed to jump on the
mediation bandwagon will be addressed below, followed by a discussion of
the underlying argument.
Many commentators note that mediation is still not commonly used by
lawyers. 154 If lawyers have, in fact, been charmed by the rhetoric of dispute
resolution, voluntary use of alternative dispute resolution processes would
be much greater than it is, and mandates to use mediation would be
unnecessary. A number of explanations have been advanced to explain
lawyers' failure to use mediation in cases in which settlement is an attractive
option.'5s Lack of knowledge about the benefits and risks of mediation is a
151 Nader, supra note 1, at 20-23.
152 Id at 14.
153 Id. at 1, 3.
154 See generally Edward A. Dauer, Impediments to ADR, 18 COLO. LAW. 839 (1989);
STEVEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER
PROCESSES 422 (1992); JOHN P. MCCRORY, INTRODUCTION TO A STUDY OF BARRIERS TO THE
USE OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION i-iii (1984); Debra L. Shapiro &
Deborah M. Kolb, Reducing the Litigious Mentality by Increasing Employees' Desire to
Communicate Grievances, in THE LEGALISTIC ORGANIZATION 312-20 (Sim B. Sitkin & Robert
J. Bies eds., 1994).
155 Oilda M. Salazar, Resistance to Mediation Within the Legal Profession, in
MEDIATION: CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES 125 (Joseph E. Polenski & Harold M. Launer eds.,
1986); Paul V. Olczak, Resistance to Mediation: A Socio-Clinical Analysis, COMMUNITY
MEDIATION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS AND RESEARCHERS 153, 162-63 (Karen G.
Duffy et al. eds., 1991). Dauer, supra note 154, at 840, 841, notes that lawyers may
erroneously perceive that clients want aggressive litigation, that lawyers prefer litigation to
ADR, and that they fail to see the advantages of ADR. Deanne C. Siemer notes attorney
concern over losing control of the case, fear of exposing the client, risk of losing fees, fear of
free discovery or appearing too eager to settle, setting unrealistic settlement ranges, working
on unrealistic timetables, fear of wasting time, and concern about communications to the judge
as factors biasing lawyers against ADR. Perspective of Advocates and Clients on Court-
Sponsored ADR, in EMERGING ADR ISSUES IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 166, 168-75
(Frank E.A. Sander ed., 1991)
Speaking from experience, my partners in law practice did not hesitate to question my
judgment when I took a forty-hour divorce mediation training course. In the past few years, I
have seen some change in attitude as attorneys have been exposed to mediation and liked the
results. Even so, the pace of change has been slow.
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR NADER
common theory used to explain limited use of mediation by lawyers. 156 For
example, lawyers may confuse mediation with arbitration.157 Speaking from
experience, many lawyers also tend to assume that mediation is the same
thing as attorney negotiation, or that it has no advantage over negotiation.
Failure to understand the distinction between the two processes would tend
to make the lawyer feel mediation would be neither necessary nor helpful.
Lack of practical experience with mediation could also make a lawyer feel
very uncomfortable with recommending its use to a client.
Another reason advanced for limited use of mediation by lawyers
concerns the process of legal education. Law schools focus on training
students to maneuver within the court system. The emphasis is on the
adversarial system as the only accepted method for the resolution of
disputes. In direct contrast to Professor Nader's assertion that legal
education makes law students easy prey to the rhetoric of peace and
harmony, 158 others argue that the law school socialization process
indoctrinates aspiring attorneys with an adversarial, win-lose mentality. 159
Clearly, both arguments cannot be correct. Random review of course
catalogs from law schools should show relatively few courses focusing on
dispute resolution, in comparison to courses emphasizing substantive law,
derived from court decisions and statutes. In sum, the assertion that lawyers
have bought into alternative dispute resolution in a wholesale fashion is
belied by the evidence and norms of legal culture.
Professor Nader uses a law firm ethnography to show that hierarchy
and social control inhibit the development and expression of complaints
about working conditions. 160 In the study, she describes the way in which
junior associates are induced to work long hours and sacrifice their personal
lives to the revenue generation needs of the firm. 161
Nader states that lawyers "are particularly susceptible to the kinds of
control effects documented in cults" due to their long work hours and little
contact with the outside world. 162 She provides no evidence for this
conclusion. Indeed, it requires quite a leap of logic to analogize the practice.
of law to thought control programs.
156 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 143, at 422; Dauer, supra note 154, at 841.
157 Dauer, supra note 154, at 841.
158 Nader, supra note 1, at 3.
159 Salazar, supra note 155, at 126-27; OLczAK, supra note 146, at 163; Leonard
Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43-46 (1982); Edward Sutton,
Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution and Legal Education, in A STUDY OF BARRIERS TO
THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 219, 223 (1984).
160 Nader, supra note 1, at 14-17.
161 Id.
1 62 Id. at 3, 4.
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The goal of a true thought control program is to change the individual
to serve "a hidden organizational purpose. "163 This is done by undermining
the individual's basic self-concept and beliefs.164 According to researchers,
thought control programs must include six conditions: (1) control over the
person's time and thoughts, (2) controlling the environment, (3) creating a
sense of powerlessness, (4) manipulating rewards and punishments to help
learning the new ideology and to change behavior reflecting prior values,
(5) maintaining a closed system of logic in which the person receives the
message that any criticisms of those in power reflect his or her own errors
or inadequacies, and (6) keeping the person ignorant of what is
happening. 165 The data came from cults, therapeutic communities, and large
group awareness trainings - not employment settings.
The most obvious difference between cult programming and law firms
is simply that law firms lack hidden purposes - their function is to earn
money by providing legal services to clients. Certainly law firms reward
long hours and loyalty, since these relate to profits, but so do other
employers. In addition, law firms do not seem to have enough control over
their employees' time and thoughts to create blind loyalty to the
organization, as shown by Nader's own reports of pointed criticisms of the
organization made by employees, including associates, when anonymity was
guaranteed. 166 She also notes that some lawyers in large firms leave or
choose to work limited hours. 167 The practice of law in large firms may
deserve hearty criticism, but to say law firms have the kind of control over
employees as cults have over followers seems far-fetched. 168
There are alternative explanations for young associates' failure to voice
complaints about working conditions. One factor inhibiting criticism is that
employees who complain can often be retaliated against with impunity.
With the exception of laws prohibiting employment discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, national origin, religion, 169 age, 170 and handicap,
171
163 Margaret Thaler Singer & Richard Ofshe, Thought Reform Programs and the
Production of Psychiatric Casualties, 20 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 188, 189-90 (1990).
16 4 Id. at 189.
165 Id. at 189-90.
166 Nader, supra note 1, at 14, 16.
167 Id. at 6.
168 Many large firm lawyers I know freely voice criticisms of their firms. None show
the anomie or significant psychological disturbances shown by persons leaving thought control
programs, as discussed by Singer & Ofshe, supra note 163, at 191.
169 See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (1981).
170 See generally Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 620 et seq.
(1981).
171 See generally Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1981).
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employers are generally free to hire and fire at will. 172 An associate seldom
has meaningful protection against negative repercussions caused by voicing
complaints. In addition, large law firm practice offers advantages, such as
high pay 73 and challenging work.174 Life in a large firm is not all bad.
Professor Nader does not tie her study of large law firm culture to law
firm promotion of the use of alternative dispute resolution processes. It
seems that lawyers in the large firm setting would have little incentive to
blindly buy into the rhetoric of alternative dispute resolution. As Nader
notes, large firms need to generate large numbers of billable hours in order
to maintain profitability. 175 If a case settles in mediation, the client usually
saves money, including future attorney fees. 176 The large firms have also
developed large litigation sections, creating a possible institutional force
towards increasing litigation.177 Although attorneys should be concerned
with minimizing costs to clients, firm economics could possibly create a
disincentive for referrals to mediation by lawyers in large firms. Economic
considerations, in concert with the other factors giving rise to resistance of
alternative dispute resolution by lawyers, would seem to influence lawyers
in large firms to reject the rhetoric of alternative dispute resolution, absent
successful experiences with mediation.
Only a small percentage of lawyers work for the large firms Nader
discusses. Most lawyers work for government, in public service positions,
in small firms, and in solo practices. 178 These jobs do not require the hours
and loyalty Nader describes, yet many of these lawyers see value in
mediation.
Many lawyers who have embraced alternative dispute resolution have
done so based on their perceptions of inadequacies in the traditional
adversarial system. These perceptions are based upon their practical
172 See, e.g., Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1992) and cases
cited therein, noting that fraud in the inducement of an employment relationship can create a
cause of action, but that employers are generally free to fire employees without contracts for
any or no cause. Young associates seldom have enough leverage to negotiate employment
contracts with large firms.
173 AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, supra note 139, at 73.
174 Id. at 75-76. The report also notes that the recent downsizing of many large firms
created a temporary market glut of experienced lawyers.
175 Nader, supra note 1, at 15.
1 76 Erika S. Fine & Elizabeth S. Plapinger, ADR Overview, in CONTAINING LEGAL
CosTs (Erika S. Fine & Elizabeth F. Plapinger eds., 1988); Salazar, supra note 154, at 130.
1 77 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 154, at 423.
178 Of the 71% of lawyers in private practice in 1988, only 14.6% practice in firms of
51 or more attorneys. When all practicing attorneys are counted, 10.5% work in large firms.
AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, supra note 139, at 33-34.
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experiences with the court system. No institution is perfect - including the
mediation systems now in place in many jurisdictions - and the adversarial
system has flaws.
Litigation can be the best choice for certain cases. However, litigation
carries risks. Trial preparation is time-consuming and therefore expensive.
A judge or jury cannot be expected to completely agree with the perceptions
and arguments of any of the parties to a case, for the simple reason that
people rarely see events in the same way. Litigants lose a significant amount
of control over the outcome of their case if it is decided by a judge. These
considerations are certainly factors in favor of a negotiated resolution before
trial.
Trial rates have dropped significantly over the last forty years. 17 9 It
seems odd that trial rates would drop so dramatically if the practicing bar
did not find good reasons to settle cases.
II. CONCLUSION
Influence and persuasion are fundamentally different from control.
Professor Nader's critique fails to distinguish between the two. The law
firm ethnography she uses to show the dangers of harmony ideology arises
from a coercive setting.' 80 The employing partners have great control over
the fates of their employees. This control is a major factor in repressing the
expression of critical ideas. However, power is not capable of repressing the
critical thoughts themselves. When employees are guaranteed anonymity,
they freely voice pointed criticisms of their firms. 181
Professor Grillo's most gripping example of the dangers of bad
mediation, the case of Kenny, is a composite drawn from a jurisdiction
giving the mediator the power to make custody recommendations to the
court if the mediation results in non-resolution. 182 The story is an excellent
argument against the implementation of this policy.183
When coercion is absent, mediation looks different. Most participants
are capable of "holding their own" during discussions, of expressing strong
opinions and emotions, and of actively defending their interests. There is no
guarantee that some people will not be overly susceptible to influence.
However, experience shows that few people fail to stand up for themselves
179 Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, supra note 29, at 8.
180 Nader, supra note 1, at 14-20.
181 Id. at 16.
182 Grillo, supra note 66, at 1562, 1569, 1594.
183 It also makes an excellent case for the inclusion of lawyers in divorce mediation, for
critical dialogue concerning mediator training and education, and for peer review of mediator
performance.
[Vol. 10:1 1994]
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR NADER
when free to do so.14*
Unlike Professor Nader,185 I have no problem with encouraging a
mediator to ask the parties if they have fully considered the consequences of
the courses of action open to them. Have they discounted the value of
settlement? What are their needs, as opposed to their positions? How might
their needs be met? Often, resolution will involve compromises made by all
sides. The real question is whether compromise makes sense, given the
gains obtained in the trade-off. Thoughtful settlement advances self-
determination; it can create true harmony. Coercive settlement produces
only the appearance of harmony.
Discussion of the relative merits of adjudication and mediation reflects
the tension between differing societal values and goals. On the one hand,
our culture places great value on the protection of individual rights and
freedoms. On the other hand, not all members of American society can get
what they want. Often, accommodation of conflicting goals through
compromise is necessary for the continued functioning of society. Assertion
of rights has value. Compromise and accommodation among competing
interests have value too. Our society needs to support avenues for both
vindication of rights and mutual accommodation. Neither approach is
inherently superior to the other. Ideally, the participants to a conflict are in
the best position to decide whether to seek redress for complaints through
the courts, or to settle the dispute in another way.
The fairness of mediation to members of traditionally disadvantaged
groups is a serious issue. Although research shows high levels of participant
satisfaction with the mediation process, it is not right to ask people to
happily acquiesce in their own oppression. If further study shows mediation
results are relatively unfair to certain groups, the process must be improved.
If improvement is impossible, then the continued use of mediation should be
re-evaluated. At present, the evidence of unfairness is not strong enough to
support abandonment of the process.
Mediation has the potential to foster both resolution and repression.
Proponents of mediation need to think critically and act carefully with
respect to both program design and skills training," in order to maximize
mediation's ability to help people achieve consensual resolution through free
choice, rather than informally coerced assent. Mediation's transformative
potential has real value. Mediators also need to recognize that not all cases
can or should be settled. Adjudication may be a more appropriate choice for
parties in some situations.
Mediation is imperfect. Negotiation is imperfect. Adjudication is
184 See also BEER, supra note 15, at 228 (stating that, "Few people are willing to lay
themselves out like a rug for the other party to walk over.").
185 Nader, supra note 1, at 12.
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imperfect. Rather than discard any of these options, we should examine the
shortcomings of all, and make changes in all, where change will appear to
do good. This may help make better options for dispute resolution available
to more members of society.
